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20 November 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR/INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Comments for DD/I on General Gehlen's "Reflections on the World Situation"

Attached is a suggested draft of comments on General Gehlen's "Reflections on the World Situation". My understanding was that a detailed analysis was not required, and accordingly we have drafted these comments in a form suitable for incorporation in a letter of appreciation to General Gehlen.

**Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates**

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DRAFT COMMENT FOR GENERAL GEHLEN ON HIS
"REFLECTIONS ON THE WORLD SITUATION"

1. Our senior intelligence officers have found your study of 6 July, Gedanken zur Weltlage, stimulating and helpful. We have recently been giving a great deal of time and thought to what the East-West power relationship might be ten or fifteen years from now. Like you, we find it extremely difficult to sketch out even a few major trends over so long a period ahead, and, also like you, we recognize that as much or more of the future depends on the way things shape up in the West as on developments inside the Soviet Bloc.

2. On Western policy, particularly on U.S. affairs, we in the foreign intelligence field are incompetent to speak. On the matter of long-range Soviet developments, however, we are thinking along lines not dissimilar to yours. We have gone on record recently as believing that the change in regime in the USSR has in no way altered the basic hostility of the USSR to all non-Soviet power or reduced the probability of vigorous Soviet cold-war efforts. As you put it, the new elastic methods (elastischen Methoden) reflect a change of tactics but not of aims (einen Wechsel der Taktik, nicht einen Wechsel der Ziele).

3. Your belief that general war is not likely in the immediate future is shared by most observers here, and all agree

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that security from the danger of general war in the period from three to five or ten years ahead will depend greatly on the progress made in strengthening European defenses in the meantime.

4. We also concur in your estimate that the Kremlin counts a great deal in the long run on being successful in exploiting the colonial peoples in underdeveloped areas both for propaganda purposes and for subversive operations. The political and social instability in such areas represents one of the major difficulties we have noted for the West in building up its total power position relative to the USSR.

5. Concerning the June uprisings in East Germany, we note with great interest and agree with your observation that the spontaneous demonstration of popular will is of great psychological importance but that it would be dangerous to overestimate its immediate political significance in terms of effective resistance.

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7. Similarly, while we are alert to potentially very real dangers in the Yugoslav relationship with the Soviet Bloc, our best estimate is that Tito still finds his best interests to lie with the West and that, being a realist as you say, he is not very likely to attempt a double-cross that would put him back in range of Soviet wrath while depriving him of any chance of Western support in a future crisis with the Kremlin.

8. In closing, let me thank you on behalf of myself and my senior colleagues for the trouble you have taken in drafting your study and for the help it has been to our own thinking on these broad and complex problems.